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Abstract
I compare personal and household income taxation and study the effects of tax progression
under the two systems. Potential reforms of the Italian tax system are simulated,
endogenizing labor supply reactions. Results show that, with respect to a number of
indicators, the choice of the tax unit is more relevant than the degree of progression of the tax
schedule. A personal and progressive tax system provides incentives to female labor supply
and turns out to be the most effective in redistributing income and raising revenue, with little
productive costs compared with a flat tax rate. Household taxation has instead a number of
drawbacks when coupled with a progressive tax schedule.
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A vast theoretical literature has established that, for a given pre-tax income distribution, post-
tax inequality decreases as the degree of tax progression increases1. When income is endogenous 
then the relationship between tax progression and inequality depends, among other things, on labor 
supply elasticity2: empirical investigation on real tax systems seems in this case the only way to 
derive any conclusion.  A related feature of a tax system is the choice of the tax unit3. While this 
choice is neutral under proportional taxation, this is clearly not the case in a progressive tax system. 
Consider for example a household with given total income: different pre-tax income distributions 
among family members will have no consequences under proportionality but can produce 
significantly different total tax liabilities under progression. It is then clear that the choice of the tax 
unit can also induce significant behavioral reaction by taxed agents and that those reactions can 
actively interact with the degree of progression. 
This paper has two main purposes. On one side we will ask if income tax progression is still 
effective as a redistributive device when we take into account labor supply. On the other side, and 
most importantly, we will try to understand what are the consequences of different tax unit choices 
and how do they interact with the degree of progression in the tax schedule. Most countries have 
adopted solutions that lie between the two extreme possibilities of individual and household taxation. 
Also, a number of family benefits and deductions are in place also where individual income is taxed. 
It is then legitimate to ask what are the consequences of this choice. 
For this purpose, we will present an empirical analysis on Italian data. Labor supply reactions 
depend on many country-specific elements and therefore, rather than attempting at deriving general 
conclusions, it seems that the best strategy is to focus on a specific case. We found that the 
disincentives on labor supply are much stronger when tax progression is coupled with household 
income taxation. Also, because of its low impact on labor supply, personal progressive income 
taxation seems the most effective in equalizing post-tax income distribution and generating revenue. 
  
 
2. The model 
 
We will carry out the analysis by using a miscrosimulation model of the Italian tax system. 
This model is divided into two parts: the first reproduces the Italian income tax system (IRPEF) and 
its impact in transforming gross incomes into net incomes; the second model simulates labor supply 
for any exogenous tax system and, therefore, determines gross incomes. Preferences, wage rates and 
the tax system are the exogenous ingredients of this model. 
 Our work will rely on the paper by Aaberge, Colombino and Strøm (1999) (ACS) on labor 
supply in Italy. This is the first study on labor supply in Italy based on survey data. In particular we 
will use the same dataset used in ACS, we will adopt the same utility function to represent agents’ 
behavior and we will use their estimates of the wage rates4.  
Our data-set is derived from the Banca d’Italia household survey for the year 1987. It 
consists of 2953 households and 5906 individuals. Households’ income comes mainly from paid 
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 See Fellman (1976), Jakobsson (1977), Kakwani (1977). 
2
 See Preston (1990). 
3
 This has received far less attention than the degree of progression.  In Lambert (1993), a comprehensive review of the 
literature, the term tax unit is mentioned only once. 
4
 We will assume that wage rates are independent of labor supply and of the fiscal system. Details on preferences and the 
reconstruction of wage rates (as well as descriptive statistics) can be found in ACS.   
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employment: the limit for income from self-employment is set to 20% of total household income. 
This income, as well as capital income not subject to IRPEF is kept constant. 
The IRPEF system is represented by the function t(.) in the following equation: 
 
Ci=GYi - [t(Yi , Ii , DEDi , DETi)+s(Ki)]      [1] 
 
where Ci  is agent i’s net income, GYi  is total gross income, Yi  is gross income from 
employment, Ii is taxable unearned income, DEDi  are deductions from the tax base,  DETi are 
deductions from the tax liability, s(.) represents the tax system applied to other incomes and Ki is 
income not subject to IRPEF. 
Agents’ preferences are represented by a household utility function 
 
U=U( x)          [2] 
 
where x= {C, Lm, Lf}, with  Lm  and  Lf  respectively the male’s and female’s leisure time 
and C = Cm + Cf . From [1] we know that net income is a function of labor supply; therefore the 
choice variable is two-dimensional; it can be represented as (hm,hf), the vector of household labor 
supply, with hi =T- Li (T is total time available). Taking a one-year period as the time unit, we have 
that this vector has to satisfy the feasibility constraint (hm,hf) ∈  Ω ⊆ ℜ2. As a matter of fact, each 
household’s choice usually happens to be concentrated on a subset Bi (i = 1,…,2953) of the feasible 
set  Ω.  In the implementation of the model it is therefore convenient to focus our attention on Bi. For 
each household the set Bi will be represented by the observed choice plus a number of other 
alternatives randomly drawn from Ω, with probabilities determined according to the observed 
distributions5 of hf and hm.  
We can then state the maximization problem of household i as:  
 
max U(Ci ,Lm, Lf) with respect to (Lm,Lf)  
 s.t. Ci=GYi - [t(Yi , Ii , DEDi , DETi)+s(Ki)] 
 and (hm,hf) ∈Bi. 
 
Let us specify the utility function as  
 
U(x)=V(x;θ) + ε         [3] 
 
 where θ  is a vector of parameters and ε is assumed i.i.d. according to the first type extreme 
value (Gumbel) distribution. Indicating with S the number of alternatives in Bi, with pj the 
probability that the alternative xj is chosen from Ω and with Pr(j|Bi) the probability that our agent 
chooses j from the restricted choice set Bi, it is then possible to prove that6  
 
                                                           
5
 By drawing the choice set from the distribution of the observed number of hours, we are also implicitly considering 
constraints that derive from labor demand or institutional features of the labor market. 
6
 See McFadden (1978). 
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where pj=Pr(hm=hmj)×Pr(hf=hfj). In general, the expected value of any function g(x) can be 
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3. Tax progression in a personal tax system 
 
The IRPEF system is first compared with a proportional tax rate under the constraint of ex 
ante balanced budget: i.e. the flat tax rate is such that, if there were no behavioral reactions, the tax 
revenue would be the same we simulate for IRPEF. This allows to isolate the effects of the different 
tax systems on total revenue.  
We find that progressive taxation Lorenz-dominates8 the proportional tax system (Tab. 2). 
Proportional taxation, however, increases average net income by 0.77% (Tab. 1). We then evaluate 
the two systems by using the Generalized Lorenz (GL) dominance criterion. Apart from the top 
decile the GL curve referred to progressive taxation dominates the one of the proportional system 
(Tab. 4). Thus, the increase in income generated by a flat tax rate is all concentrated among the 
richest decile of the population. 
Looking at gross incomes, the shift from progression to proportional taxation increases total 
gross income by 0.05%: since the increase in net income is much bigger, we clearly have a decrease 
in public revenue (Tab. 1). Why this result? When we disaggregate by gender, it is possible to see 
that males income increases by 0.58% while females income decreases by 1.99%: the cross income 
effect (i.e. labor supply elasticity to the partner’s income) is larger than the substitution effect in a 
certain number of households. Since husbands will generally face lower marginal tax rates under 
proportionality, they will increase their labor supply thus inducing a reduction in the labor supply of 
their partners, whose marginal tax rates are instead higher under proportionality.  
Tab. 4 also reports the GL curves of gross labor income in the two cases9. Males labor 
income is higher with proportional taxation across all deciles; however for the top decile the increase 
                                                           
7
 Notice that our consistent estimation of (hm,hf)* is not necessarily contained in Bi but we will certainly have 
(hm,hf)*∈conv(Bi). 
8
 In what follows we will use a number of concepts and instruments for measuring inequality that, for obvious reasons, 
cannot be presented in this paper. For introductions to inequality measures see for example Lambert (1993) or 
Champernowne and Cowell (1998). Also, notice that the term dominance here will be used only as a descriptive device 
and does not carry any normative judgment. 
9
 Since we always consider the whole sample, the first deciles of females’ labor income are equal to zero: this depends on 
the fact that not all agents will participate in the labor market. On the other side, focusing only on active labor force could 
be misleading as participation too depends on the tax system. 
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(∆GL) is higher with IRPEF: among the richest, the income effect tends to prevail. Female labor 
supply (measured in efficiency units) is instead always lower: tax progression creates an incentive to 
female labor supply. 
Coming to redistribution, the comparison of pre-tax and post-tax Lorenz curves shows clearly 
that progression has a stronger equalizing power (Tab. 2). When looking at GL curves (Tab. 4), we 
should consider both the effect on redistribution and that on revenue (which is lower with 
proportional taxation). Similar results are also confirmed by global indicators of inequality (Tab. 3). 
With progressive taxation the post-tax Gini index is lower and the pre-tax Gini index is higher, when 
compared with the correspondent index with proportional tax. This gives an higher Reynolds-
Smolensky index of redistribution. At the same time tax liabilities are more concentrated in a 




4. Tax progression and the choice of the tax unit 
 
We will now consider a proposal of reform that was explicitly debated in the Italian 
parliament during the nineties. According to this proposal each household income Y is divided into 
“parts” y=Y/N, according to the family size: the IRPEF rule t(…) described in equation [1] is then 
applied to y instead of individual incomes. Total tax liability is then given by T=N×t(y). N is equal to 
1 for the first household component and 0.5 for the others. Family benefits and deductions have been 
excluded from the model, since there is less scope for such correction mechanisms with household 
taxation. In the simulation, t(…) is represented by the IRPEF system in place in 1987; thus, we can 
directly compare these results with those of the previous section.  
 As one could expect, household taxation (HT) reduces women’s labor supply, which is lower 
both compared with personal progressive or personal proportional taxation (Tab. 4). On the other 
side, men’s labor supply is not particularly boosted (and is below what can be obtained with a flat tax 
rate). As a consequence, HT implies a substantial fall in income produced.  Post-tax incomes are 
instead generally higher: this is due to the large loss in total tax revenue with respect to both 
proportional and personal progressive taxation. It seems also clear that HT reduces labor supply 
particularly among high-income households, while it tends to increase gross income among the 
poorest households. Disaggregating by gender, women have lower pre-tax income independently of 
their decile, while only men of the first eight deciles have higher pre-tax incomes. 
Let us now turn to the redistributive implications of the reform. As a consequence of what 
obtained on labor supply, the pre-tax Lorenz curve dominates the one referred to personal taxation 
for the first seven deciles (see Tab. 2), though the entity of the difference is quite modest, as shown 
also by the Gini indices (Tab. 3). The Reynolds-Smolensky index, however, shows that the 
redistributive impact of HT goes beyond the effect on gross incomes. Also, the HT post-tax Lorenz 
curve is above the correspondent IRPEF curve for the first eight deciles. Tax liabilities are clearly 
more concentrated in the HT case but both average tax rate and total revenues fall considerably (see 
Tabs. 1 and 3).  
A complete evaluation of the proposal also requires an analysis of the consequences of the 
reform for different household typologies. Looking at Tab. 5 one could be tempted to conclude that 
larger and poorer households should benefit from the reform. This conclusion would actually be 
wrong. It is true that the poorest households and the largest households benefit from the reform but 
this is not the case for the households that are both the poorest and the largest. Using the Atkinson-
Bourguignon criterion of sequential generalized dominance (Tab. 6), it turns out that the HT system 
dominates IRPEF for households with less than 3 children. When the number of kids is equal or 
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larger than 3 then in the first decile IRPEF dominates HT: thus, HT ends up being harmful exactly 
for the largest and poorest households. In fact, when income is low and family size is large, the loss 
of family benefits and deductions (proportional to the size) is superior to the saving in tax liabilities 
(directly dependent on income). 
Finally, HT substantially reduces total revenue: the tendency of HT generalized Lorenz 
curves to dominate the correspondent IRPEF curves is mainly due to an increase in average net 
income. If this was due to an increase in overall output then the generalized Lorenz dominance could 
represent a valid normative criterion. However, when this is only due to a revenue loss, any 
judgment would be arbitrary or it must be based on the assumption that revenue has no impact on 
public welfare. It should be noted that if each income class receives back 5.1% of their income (thus 
maintaining a balanced budget), IRPEF would dominate HT. To say anything about welfare it is then 
necessary to know the incidence of public expenditure and the behavioral reactions it would induce, 






 The disincentives associated with high marginal tax rates are well known in economic 
literature and have often influenced actual tax reforms. Comparably little attention has been devoted 
to the choice of the tax unit. It is worth noting that the disincentives attributed to tax progression 
have received particular attention in countries that tax households rather than individuals. This work 
analyzes the effects of income tax progression under alternative tax units when labor supply is 
endogenous. Our results show that progressivity and the choice of the tax unit interact in many 
interesting ways. By distinguishing between the two we conclude that the choice of the tax unit can 
have much more relevant implications for labor supply, inequality and the tax revenue than the 
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Males’ Gross Labour Income +0.58% +0.1% 
Females’ Gross Labour Income. -1.99% -3% 
Total Gross Labour Income +0.05% -0.56% 
Gross Income +0.04% -0.35% 
Net Income +0.77% +1.14% 




Tab. 2: Lorenz Curves of Gross and Net Income  
__________________________________________________________________________ 
                         IRPEF                                Flat Tax Rate      HT 
Deciles Gross  Net  Gross  Net  Gross  Net  
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
1° 0.0441 0.0495 0.0441 0.0477 0.0446 0.0508 
2° 0.1028 0.1121 0.1029 0.1083 0.1033 0.1140 
3° 0.1709 0.1833 0.1709 0.1775 0.1712 0.1855 
4° 0.2476 0.2627 0.2478 0.2551 0.2477 0.2647 
5° 03327 0.3496 0.3332 0.3408 0.3329 0.3516 
6° 0.4265 0.4448 0.4274 0.4348 0.4268 0.4465 
7° 0.5313 0.5497 0.5322 0.5392 0.5314 0.5509 
8° 0.6505 0.6678 0.6513 0.6571 0.6504 0.6681 
9° 0.7923 0.8056 0.7930 0.7968 0.7921 0.8055 





Tab. 3: Global Indicators 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 Gpre Gpost ΠRS Gtax ΠK t ΠRS/Gpre 
IRPEF 0,240 0,215 0,025 0,345 0,105 21,08 0,104 
Flat tax 0,239 0,228 0,011 0,290 0,051 20,47 0,046 
HT 0,239 0,212 0,027 0,352 0,113 19,55 0.113 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
G = Gini Index;  ΠRS = Reynolds & Smolensky Index = Gpre –Gpost; ΠK = Kakwani Index = Gtax - Gpre 
 t = average tax rate 
__________________________________________________________________________
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Tab. 4: Generalized Lorenz Curves 
(in thousand liras) 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
                       IRPEF      Flat Tax Rate           HT 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Dec. 
ML FL HL HTG HTN  ML FL HL HTG HTN  ML FL HL HTG HTN 
 
1° 997 0 1481 1787 1589  1014 0 1481 1789 1544  1006 0 1495 1801 1648 
2° 2611 0 3511 4166 3596  2648 0 3520 4171 3501  2629 0 3526 4170 3698 
3° 4497 0 5875 6924 5882  4554 0 5892 6930 5739  4523 0 5883 6912 6018 
4° 6602 25 8561 10033 8428  6679 0 8582 10047 8245  6637 0 8551 10000 8588 
5° 8927 518 11510 13483 11215  9025 448 11585 13508 11014  8969 454 11523 13440 11406 
6° 11498 1226 14871 17282 14266  11610 1131 14909 17323 14054  11540 1131 14815 17231 14482 
7° 14352 2176 18552 21525 17630  14485 2062 18599 21575 17426  14395 2053 18475 21454 17869 
8° 17590 3373 22669 26356 21417  17746 3249 22721 26401 21238  17637 3226 22565 26258 21672 
9° 21471 4854 27535 32102 25836  21635 4724 27582 32141 25736  21509 4678 27392 31979 26120 
10° 27541 7139 34675 40513 32070  27702 6996 34693 40531 32318  27561 6924 34481 40372 32435 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
ML= male gross labour income 
FL = female gross labour income 
HL = Total household gross labour income 
HTG = Total household gross income 





Tab. 5: Gains and losses from IRPEF to HT 
    ___________________________________________________________________________ 
         Per Income Deciles     Per family size 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
1 + 3.7  No kids -0.47 
2 +2.10  1 kid +1.64 
3 +1.48  2 kids +3.56 
4 +0.90  3 or more kids +4.44 
5 +1.12    
6 +0.80    
7 +0.70    
8 +0.40    
9 +0.80    





Tab. 6: Generalized and Sequential Lorenz Dominance: IRPEF versus HT  
(in thousand liras) 




QF IRPEF  QF IRPEF  QF IRPEF  QF IRPEF  
1° 1582.86 1617.59 1646.68 1607.72 1634.58 1586.95 1648.21 1589.11 
2° 3456.64 3414.39 3624.63 3496.98 3610.01 3494.515 3698.46 3596.09 
3° 5571.63 5433.04 5821.30 5597.46 5827.17 5650.61 6017.81 5881.50 
4° 7859.76 7622.48 8215.78 7911.03 8270.74 8041.41 8587.73 8427.83 
5° 10298.05 9984.69 10799.60 10433.60 10921.21 10651.46 11405.70 11214.58 
6° 12933.40 12587.20 13602.81 13165.39 13814.11 13492.77 14481.76 14266.07 
7° 16029.95 15579.92 16661.80 16149.89 16954.99 16596.13 17869.24 17629.59 
8° 19479.52 18941.54 20050.36 19462.78 20431.93 20029.40 21672.42 21417.11 
9° 23511.40 22949.88 23925.66 23271.38 24455.57 23996.72 26128.12 25835.57 
10° 28181.40 26981.86 29232.36 28178.50 30214.07 29454.53 32435.33 32069.61 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
